China has for many years now preferred
to refrain from involvement in the quagmire which is the Middle East.
Until now the region has been considered too distant, and not
sufficiently economically rewarding (apart from, of course, the need to
ensure oil supplies) to justify closer engagement. What policy there has
been has been entirely pragmatic, building on the establishment of
sound economic and technological partnerships with Israel without
disrupting relations with the diplomatically powerful Arab world.
So far, so good. But China's rise as a
global economic power, fueled by the foundation of the AIIB and the
launch of the Belt and Road initiative, has rendered it more difficult,
not to say undesirable, for China to keep her distance from the politics
and the region. And, in turn, Chinese interest in the region in the
Belt and Road context is creating a new dynamic in the Middle East, with
the potential of a major change to the balance of power in the region.
The technology and infrastructure
finance which the full flowering of the Belt and Road initiative
envisages would provide great opportunities for the economies of the
region; in particular, adding diversity to a regional economy
over-reliant on fossil fuel exports.
But there are two problems here:
Firstly, the Belt and Road initiative is so wide-ranging that the future
world will contain a diversity of potential trade routes. Secondly,
that we are on the verge of a world in which the Middle East is no
longer central to oil production and its ancillary industries. The
worldwide development of larger and more diverse sources of gas, and of
new energy-saving technologies, will ensure that that occurs within a
very short period, and the region's significance in global affairs will
necessarily decline with it.
Thus the Middle East, like any other
political-economic entity, must learn to compete to enjoy the fruits of
the coming Asian-dominated world order. And this means addressing its
intractable security problems. Infrastructure, which will always be the
central plank of international trade, must be kept secure. In the entire
history of war, breaking the enemy's lines of communication and
logistics has been a major strategic objective.
But, you will say, there is surely no
need for talk of "enemies." The world is - largely - at peace: we have a
functioning system in which agreements are made between sovereign
states under the umbrella of established international law. This is
true, but it cannot have escaped anybody's attention that the monopoly
of force by sovereign states has been breached many times in the last
decade, and that the epicenter of this phenomenon is in the Middle
Eastern region, where there are several regions not under the control of
any recognized government.
Further east, China has already
addressed the security issue in Pakistan, in building the port at
Gwadar, in western Pakistan on the Iranian border, as a major
contribution to the Belt and Road program. But there China was able to
rely on a strong and long-developed friendship with Pakistan, and is
confident that under no circumstances will the Pakistani authorities
allow threats to Sino-Pakistani joint projects.
The Middle East proper is a different
matter. While keenly conscious that the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism,
which has been demonstrably linked to Uighur separatist activists in
Xinjiang, cannot be ignored, China remains keen to avoid any
interference in the internal politics of any nation or in the balance of
forces within the region as a whole. However, China must know that
assurances of security from a national government can provide no real
security for infrastructural projects, or for those working on them.
With one exception: Israel. China has
been working, with practical mutual benefits, with Israel for thirty
years. Both countries have been entirely pragmatic in this cooperation;
neither has called on the other to adopt a particular political
position, and both have given clear demonstrations of the ability to
protect vital interests on their own soil. In an ideal world Israel
would be well placed to act as the regional hub for the Belt and Road
program. But here politics raises its ugly head again.
Clearly the basic requirement is a
sustainable solution to the Israel-Palestine problem. Up to now China
has stuck resolutely to the formula which became standard in the early
1990s: "land for peace." It made sense not to vary this formula while
everything was in chaos: But no progress has been made on either land or
peace, and even the possibility of such an exchange is beginning to
fade. What effect the opportunities offered by China's infrastructural
investment program will have on breaking the deadlock, we have yet to
see.
And then there is the question of
whether minds are flexible enough to ensure that these opportunities
will be taken up. This essentially means that common sense will have to
establish itself in areas where it has hitherto been in short supply.
Can China help?
