The Valdai Discussion Club - 27.09.2016
The extent and potential for confrontation between the major powers
is significantly lower in Central Asia than in the Asia-Pacific region
(APR), Eastern Europe or the Middle East. The potential for cooperation
is greater because Russia, China, and especially the United States have
no vital need to dominate in the region. Therefore, none of these three
powers will unleash a war against the others for the sake of Central
Asia – as compared to Europe or Southeast Asia, for example. This fact
alone could serve as a powerful resource for the development of
trilateral cooperation that could become deep and substantive, or remain
non-binding in character.
The authors of this report believe that Washington, Moscow, and
Beijing hold significant resources for cooperating to provide elements
of regional security in Central Asia. Maximum effort should go toward
advancing the common good so that confrontation does not dominate the
agenda. It is from the report that you can learn about the potential
areas and opportunities available to them for cooperation.
About authors:
Timofey Bordachev,
Programme Director of the Foundation for Development and Support of the
Valdai Discussion Club, Director of the Center for Comprehensive
European and International Studies at the National Research University –
Higher School of Economics, Ph.D. in Political Science.
Wan Qingsong,
Research Fellow of the Center for Russian Studies (the National Key
Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences under the Ministry
of Education of PRC), School of Advanced International and Area Studies
at East China Normal University; Research Fellow of the Center for
Co-development with Neighboring Countries (University - Based Think Tank
of Shanghai); holds a Doctorate in Political Science.
Andrew Small, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, Asia program, German Marshall Fund of the United States.
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Wednesday, September 28, 2016
Tuesday, September 27, 2016
What's Next For China-Israel Investments?
Shlomo Freund
FORBES - SEPTEMBER 22, 2016
The story that runs in Israel every few weeks now is “The Chinese are coming” — and it comes in a few different contexts.
The most prominent stories of the last few years were a few mega deals in the Israeli market of Chinese companies buying Israeli companies. One of the most famous ones happened in May 2014 when China’s Bright Food Group bought the most popular dairy called Tnuva, a company that for many Israelis symbolizes the country itself.
There were a lot of debates if a national symbol such as Tnuva should really be sold to a foreign entity, especially a Chinese one. What people in Israel forgot is that the majority of Tnuva stocks was sold in 2008 to Apax Partners, which is a British fund active in Israel since 1984. Back then there wasn’t such a fuss around the deal.
Another publicized deal was the selling of Phoenix insurance company to Fosun. This made headlines a few times as the deal was supposed to close by June 2015 but eventually was canceled in February 2016 as reported. This happened because of the objections of the Ministry of Finance over whether a foreign entity should hold Israeli pension funds.
Megadeals like these arise in headlines every one to two years.
READ MORE....
FORBES - SEPTEMBER 22, 2016
The story that runs in Israel every few weeks now is “The Chinese are coming” — and it comes in a few different contexts.
The most prominent stories of the last few years were a few mega deals in the Israeli market of Chinese companies buying Israeli companies. One of the most famous ones happened in May 2014 when China’s Bright Food Group bought the most popular dairy called Tnuva, a company that for many Israelis symbolizes the country itself.
There were a lot of debates if a national symbol such as Tnuva should really be sold to a foreign entity, especially a Chinese one. What people in Israel forgot is that the majority of Tnuva stocks was sold in 2008 to Apax Partners, which is a British fund active in Israel since 1984. Back then there wasn’t such a fuss around the deal.
Another publicized deal was the selling of Phoenix insurance company to Fosun. This made headlines a few times as the deal was supposed to close by June 2015 but eventually was canceled in February 2016 as reported. This happened because of the objections of the Ministry of Finance over whether a foreign entity should hold Israeli pension funds.
Megadeals like these arise in headlines every one to two years.
READ MORE....
Jewish and Chinese: Explaining a Shared Identity
By CHRIS BUCKLEY
THE NEW YORK TIMES - SEPT. 25, 2016
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THE NEW YORK TIMES - SEPT. 25, 2016
The ancient Jewish community of Kaifeng, in central China, was experiencing a cultural and religious revival until a recent government clampdown, which has brought a ban on collective worship and forced out foreign Jewish groups. Moshe Yehuda Bernstein is a researcher based in Perth, Western Australia, who has studied this revival and written a coming book, “Globalization, Translation and Transmission: Sino-Judaic Cultural Identity in Kaifeng, China.” In an interview, Mr. Bernstein explained the background to the recent revival and official restrictions.
When
I told people I was working on a story about the Jews of Kaifeng, some
asked whether they’re really Jews. I’m sure you’ve been asked the same.
How did you become interested in them, and how do you answer that
question?
Fifteen years ago, when I was director of Jewish studies at Carmel School
in Perth, I was invited to lecture on Jewish topics at Nanjing
University, where one of the first Jewish studies departments in China
had been launched a few years earlier. At the final lecture, Xu Xin, the
professor who hosted me, gave me his book “The Legends of the Chinese Jews of Kaifeng.”
Until then, I had never heard of the presence of Jews in Kaifeng or
their synagogue that endured for seven centuries. This sparked an
interest in learning more about this community. As well, the enthusiasm
of Chinese students towards Jews and Judaism made me want to learn more
about Chinese culture.READ MORE....
Monday, September 19, 2016
Sunday, September 18, 2016
In China, Fears of ‘Creeping Sharia’ Proliferate Online
The country’s Muslim minorities want more regulation for halal food. Opponents say it's a gateway to extremism.
By Matthew S. Erie
FOREIGN POLICY - September 15, 2016
Over the past six months, Chinese social media outlets have been electrified by Chinese Muslim calls for a statute to regulate halal food production. On social media platform Weibo, some Chinese grassroots netizens and even scholars have equated the effort to an exercise in terrorism and linked it to Chinese Muslim radicalization. The ugly rhetoric says far more about the state of Islamophobia in China than it does about the merits of halal regulation.
The halal push comes primarily from the Hui, China’s largest Muslim group, who number at least 10 million and are far more culturally Chinese than Uighurs, another minority Muslim group with whom the majority Han have a particularly fraught history. Observant Muslims in China and elsewhere follow dietary laws that specify how meat should be prepared and which foods can and cannot be eaten. Foods that comport with these rules are “halal.” In an age of industrial mass production, labeling pre-packaged food products as halal helps Muslim consumers know which products to buy, and can expand a company’s consumer base. Similarly, a restaurant that markets itself as halal can attract a greater number of customers. But the lack of an enforced national standard in China on the production and sale of halal food has resulted in widespread suspicion that some unscrupulous enterprises are selling non-halal food, especially food that includes porcine products, as halal. That’s why Chinese Muslims, particularly the Hui, have pushed for a nationwide truth-in-labeling law on halal food since 2002.
READ MORE....
By Matthew S. Erie
FOREIGN POLICY - September 15, 2016
Over the past six months, Chinese social media outlets have been electrified by Chinese Muslim calls for a statute to regulate halal food production. On social media platform Weibo, some Chinese grassroots netizens and even scholars have equated the effort to an exercise in terrorism and linked it to Chinese Muslim radicalization. The ugly rhetoric says far more about the state of Islamophobia in China than it does about the merits of halal regulation.
The halal push comes primarily from the Hui, China’s largest Muslim group, who number at least 10 million and are far more culturally Chinese than Uighurs, another minority Muslim group with whom the majority Han have a particularly fraught history. Observant Muslims in China and elsewhere follow dietary laws that specify how meat should be prepared and which foods can and cannot be eaten. Foods that comport with these rules are “halal.” In an age of industrial mass production, labeling pre-packaged food products as halal helps Muslim consumers know which products to buy, and can expand a company’s consumer base. Similarly, a restaurant that markets itself as halal can attract a greater number of customers. But the lack of an enforced national standard in China on the production and sale of halal food has resulted in widespread suspicion that some unscrupulous enterprises are selling non-halal food, especially food that includes porcine products, as halal. That’s why Chinese Muslims, particularly the Hui, have pushed for a nationwide truth-in-labeling law on halal food since 2002.
READ MORE....
Need growing for China to take greater military role in Middle East, analysts say
Greater presence seen as way to protect nationals working abroad and growing investment in the region
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST - Sunday, 18 September, 2016
In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia and Iran when the two nations broke off diplomatic ties, in a bid to stay friendly with both sides on the Sunni-Shiite divide. He brought with him US$55 billion in loans and investments for the region, including a US$20 billion fund for the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
READ MORE...
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST - Sunday, 18 September, 2016
As China expands its interests in the Middle
East, some experts are calling for Beijing to eschew its long-standing
policy on non-interference in other countries’ affairs and set up
permanent military bases.
A more comprehensive engagement would ensure
better protection for Chinese nationals working in the region and the
significant investment by Chinese companies there, they said.
Until recently, Beijing’s foreign policy
in the Middle East has been overwhelmingly concerned with building
relationships with governments while avoiding any overt demonstrations
of influence. But that reluctance is fading.In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia and Iran when the two nations broke off diplomatic ties, in a bid to stay friendly with both sides on the Sunni-Shiite divide. He brought with him US$55 billion in loans and investments for the region, including a US$20 billion fund for the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
READ MORE...
China Is Supporting Syria's Regime. What Changed?
Michael Clarke and Raffaello Pantucci
The National Interest - September 17, 2016
On August 14, Guan Youfei, a rear admiral in China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy, visited the Syrian capital of Damascus, escorted around the city under heavy guard. Guan’s visit reportedly included meetings with senior military officials and Russian officers, as well as pledges that the Chinese military would provide medical training for Syrian medical staff. The question is why China is increasing this engagement now.
Admiral Guan’s engagement contrasts with previous Chinese behavior during the Syrian crisis. While China has been one of the few powers to maintain an embassy in Damascus throughout the current crisis, Beijing’s engagements have been fairly limited, and mostly focused on attempts from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to insert itself into peace negotiations and occasional expressions of concern around individual nationals who appear on the battlefield (either as hostages or fighters). The approach has been driven by a mix of motives, including Beijing’s long-standing principle of “non-interference,” aversion to what China sees as largely Western-led regime change in the guise of humanitarian intervention and a Chinese desire to insulate its growing economic interests in the Middle East from the continuing consequences of the Arab Spring.
READ MORE....
The National Interest - September 17, 2016
On August 14, Guan Youfei, a rear admiral in China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy, visited the Syrian capital of Damascus, escorted around the city under heavy guard. Guan’s visit reportedly included meetings with senior military officials and Russian officers, as well as pledges that the Chinese military would provide medical training for Syrian medical staff. The question is why China is increasing this engagement now.
Admiral Guan’s engagement contrasts with previous Chinese behavior during the Syrian crisis. While China has been one of the few powers to maintain an embassy in Damascus throughout the current crisis, Beijing’s engagements have been fairly limited, and mostly focused on attempts from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to insert itself into peace negotiations and occasional expressions of concern around individual nationals who appear on the battlefield (either as hostages or fighters). The approach has been driven by a mix of motives, including Beijing’s long-standing principle of “non-interference,” aversion to what China sees as largely Western-led regime change in the guise of humanitarian intervention and a Chinese desire to insulate its growing economic interests in the Middle East from the continuing consequences of the Arab Spring.
READ MORE....
Wednesday, September 14, 2016
The China-Pakistan axis: Asia’s new geopolitics
In this public seminar, Andrew Small explains the ramifications of
Sino-Pakistani ties for the West, for India, for Afghanistan and for
Asia as a whole. He explores some of the relationship's most sensitive
aspects, including Beijing's support for Pakistan's nuclear program,
China's dealings with the Taliban, and the Chinese military's planning
for crises in Pakistan. From China's involvement in South Asia's
wars to the Obama administration's efforts to secure Chinese
cooperation in stabilising the region, he traces the dilemmas Beijing
increasingly faces between pursuing its strategic rivalry with India and
the United States, and the imperative to address a terrorist threat
that has become one of the gravest dangers to China's internal
stability. Mr Small also examines China's ambitious new economic plans
for Pakistan, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and what they mean
for Beijing's ambitious ‘One Belt and One Road’ initiative. Andrew
Small is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund's
(GMF) Asia program, which he established in 2006. His research focuses
on US-China relations, Europe-China relations, Chinese policy in South
Asia, and broader developments in China's foreign and economic policy.
Mr Small was based in GMF’s Brussels office for five years, and worked
before that as the director of the Foreign Policy Centre's Beijing
office, as a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
and an Empowering Students Universally (ESU) scholar in the office of
Senator Edward M Kennedy. His articles and papers have been published in
The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy andthe Washington
Quarterly, as well as many other journals, magazines and newspapers. Mr
Small is the author of the book The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New
Geopolitics published with Hurst / Oxford University Press in 2015. He
was educated at Balliol College, University of Oxford. Andrew Small is visiting Australia as a guest of the ANU National Security College.
Joint Pakistan-China think tank launched
PAKISTAN TODAY - April 18, 2015
With Chinese President Xi Jinping’s approaching Pakistan, a three-day conference in the picturesque Chinese island of Hainan decided to launch a new Joint Pakistan-China Think Tank dedicated solely to research and development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. According to a press statement issued by the Islamabad office of Pakistan China Institute, the newly-formed think tank “Research and Development International (RANDI)”, will have two co-chairpersons; Madame Zhao Baige, former minister and currently member of parliament and vice chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, and Senator Mushahid Hussain. “The new think tank is the first joint initiative of China and Pakistan which will be dedicated to research on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” said Senator Mushahid. It would be emphasising in providing an ‘Information Corridor’ to promote perspectives, data and information for policy-makers, students, specialists, scholars and companies of both countries. The Information Corridor was organised by China’s most prestigious university, Tsinghua University, under the supervision of Professor Li Xiguang, who is also director of the Centre of Pakistan Studies, who had also addressed at the conference. The Pakistan secretariat of the new joint think tank, RANDI, would be located at the Pakistan-China Institute in Islamabad, while its China secretariat would be co-hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the China Institute of Reform & Development (CIRD), two top Chinese think tanks. A work plan for 2015 was also approved at the conference, which was attended by former Finance Minister Senator Saleem Mandviwala, Pakistan Red Crescent Society Chairman Dr Saeed Elahi, with representatives of the Board of Investment energy, economic experts and Gawadar Development Authority.
READ MORE.....
With Chinese President Xi Jinping’s approaching Pakistan, a three-day conference in the picturesque Chinese island of Hainan decided to launch a new Joint Pakistan-China Think Tank dedicated solely to research and development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. According to a press statement issued by the Islamabad office of Pakistan China Institute, the newly-formed think tank “Research and Development International (RANDI)”, will have two co-chairpersons; Madame Zhao Baige, former minister and currently member of parliament and vice chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, and Senator Mushahid Hussain. “The new think tank is the first joint initiative of China and Pakistan which will be dedicated to research on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” said Senator Mushahid. It would be emphasising in providing an ‘Information Corridor’ to promote perspectives, data and information for policy-makers, students, specialists, scholars and companies of both countries. The Information Corridor was organised by China’s most prestigious university, Tsinghua University, under the supervision of Professor Li Xiguang, who is also director of the Centre of Pakistan Studies, who had also addressed at the conference. The Pakistan secretariat of the new joint think tank, RANDI, would be located at the Pakistan-China Institute in Islamabad, while its China secretariat would be co-hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the China Institute of Reform & Development (CIRD), two top Chinese think tanks. A work plan for 2015 was also approved at the conference, which was attended by former Finance Minister Senator Saleem Mandviwala, Pakistan Red Crescent Society Chairman Dr Saeed Elahi, with representatives of the Board of Investment energy, economic experts and Gawadar Development Authority.
READ MORE.....
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Pakistan
Siegfried O.Wolf
South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF) 19 Avenue des Arts 1210 Brussels Belgium info@sadf.eu www.sadf.eu +12 026 834 180 +32 2 808 42 08 Reg. Num. BE 833606320
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multibillion-dollar infrastructure investment project, is heralded as a game changer for Pakistan’s economy. It is part of the major development initiative led by China, known as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), connecting Asia with Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and for those involved it evokes hopes, a myriad of interests, and it spurs a geopolitical shift (Ze 2015; 2014, October 2014). However, such a megaproject also raises numerous questions, especially with regards to the feasibility of its implementation in view of tremendous security challenges. In order to guarantee a secure environment for the CPEC development, the military is expanding its power. This phenomenon significantly affects the country’s civil- military relations and civilian control over the military, while challenging the process of democratic transition. To assess the correlation between CPEC development and quality of democracy, the paper applies the ‘Heidelberg Model of Civilian Control’ (Croissant et al. 2013, 2011 April, 2011, 2010, 2009); it analyses the influence of the military on the decision-making and implementation process vis-à-vis the civilian government, understood as the elected representatives of the people. It will be argued that: First, the way in which CPEC is being implemented limits the decision-making powers of the civilian government and hampers civilian control over the military. Second, since civilian control of the military is interpreted as a prerequisite for democracy, the CPEC development is undermining the process of democratic transition initiated by the 2013 general elections. Third, to ensure the CPEC development, the military has built-up a parallel governance structure, exercising tremendous executive and judicial powers and side-lining the civilian government.
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South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF) 19 Avenue des Arts 1210 Brussels Belgium info@sadf.eu www.sadf.eu +12 026 834 180 +32 2 808 42 08 Reg. Num. BE 833606320
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multibillion-dollar infrastructure investment project, is heralded as a game changer for Pakistan’s economy. It is part of the major development initiative led by China, known as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), connecting Asia with Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and for those involved it evokes hopes, a myriad of interests, and it spurs a geopolitical shift (Ze 2015; 2014, October 2014). However, such a megaproject also raises numerous questions, especially with regards to the feasibility of its implementation in view of tremendous security challenges. In order to guarantee a secure environment for the CPEC development, the military is expanding its power. This phenomenon significantly affects the country’s civil- military relations and civilian control over the military, while challenging the process of democratic transition. To assess the correlation between CPEC development and quality of democracy, the paper applies the ‘Heidelberg Model of Civilian Control’ (Croissant et al. 2013, 2011 April, 2011, 2010, 2009); it analyses the influence of the military on the decision-making and implementation process vis-à-vis the civilian government, understood as the elected representatives of the people. It will be argued that: First, the way in which CPEC is being implemented limits the decision-making powers of the civilian government and hampers civilian control over the military. Second, since civilian control of the military is interpreted as a prerequisite for democracy, the CPEC development is undermining the process of democratic transition initiated by the 2013 general elections. Third, to ensure the CPEC development, the military has built-up a parallel governance structure, exercising tremendous executive and judicial powers and side-lining the civilian government.
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Tuesday, September 13, 2016
Israel's Pivot to Asia
Insights from Avital Leibovich. MK headshot
By Mercy A. Kuo
THE DIPLOMAT - September 14, 2016
The Rebalance author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. rebalance to Asia. This conversation with Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) Avital Leibovich – Director of the American Jewish Committee’s Jerusalem office, with a distinguished career spanning over 20 years in a wide range of senior media and public relations positions within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as former Head of the Interactive Media Branch of the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit and Head of the Foreign Press Branch – is the 59th in “The Rebalance Insight Series.”
With the United States, China, and India as some of Israel’s top trading partners, what is the Asia-Pacific region’s strategic relevance to Israel?
Israel has a very diverse and innovative economy. The high-tech industry, agri-tech and entrepreneurship in Israel are rapidly expanding. As the Asia Pacific constitutes some of the world’s largest populations and economies, Israel finds these countries to have great potential for businesses, and vice versa, I believe that China and India are also interested in the great industrial potential that Israel has.
READ MORE....
By Mercy A. Kuo
THE DIPLOMAT - September 14, 2016
The Rebalance author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. rebalance to Asia. This conversation with Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) Avital Leibovich – Director of the American Jewish Committee’s Jerusalem office, with a distinguished career spanning over 20 years in a wide range of senior media and public relations positions within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as former Head of the Interactive Media Branch of the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit and Head of the Foreign Press Branch – is the 59th in “The Rebalance Insight Series.”
With the United States, China, and India as some of Israel’s top trading partners, what is the Asia-Pacific region’s strategic relevance to Israel?
Israel has a very diverse and innovative economy. The high-tech industry, agri-tech and entrepreneurship in Israel are rapidly expanding. As the Asia Pacific constitutes some of the world’s largest populations and economies, Israel finds these countries to have great potential for businesses, and vice versa, I believe that China and India are also interested in the great industrial potential that Israel has.
READ MORE....
Şanghay Belediyesi Hükümet Bursları Başvuruları Devam Ediyor!
Şangay hükümeti lisans ve yüksek lisans eğitimine Çin’de devam etmek isteyen öğrenciler için burs verecektir.
Lisans Bursu için aşağıdaki kriterleri yerine getiriyor olmak gerekmektedir.
Ayrıntılı bilgi için buraya tıklayınız.
Lisans Bursu için aşağıdaki kriterleri yerine getiriyor olmak gerekmektedir.
- T.C. vatandaşı olmak
- İyi bir akademik geçmişe sahip olmak,
- Felsefe, Ekonomi, Hukuki Araştırmalar, Eğitim, Edebiyat, Tarih ve Yönetim bölümlerinden birinde eğitim görüyor olmak,
- Çin hükümetinden herhangi bir burs almıyor olmak.
- T.C. vatandaşı olmak
- İyi bir akademik geçmişe sahip olmak,
- 35 yaşın altında olmak,
- Felsefe, Ekonomi, Hukuki Araştırmalar, Eğitim, Edebiyat, Tarih ve Yönetim bölümlerinden birinde eğitim görüyor olmak,
- Çin hükümetinden herhangi bir burs almıyor olmak.
Ayrıntılı bilgi için buraya tıklayınız.
Sunday, September 11, 2016
A Song of the Red Sea: Communities and Networks of Chinese Muslims in the Hijaz
By: Hyeju Jeong, Duke University History Department
Published by King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies
While the Chinese Muslim diaspora population in Saudi Arabia is smaller than the diaspora populations of South Asia, Central Asia or Southeast Asia, whose historical ties with the coasts of the Red Sea are known to have left enduring vestiges in and around Mecca, Chinese Muslim communities have forged their own enclaves in the Hijaz and beyond for the past century or so, making permanent homes in different parts of the Kingdom. Journeying from various parts of China, they arrived in Mecca, Ta’if and Jeddah as pilgrims, students, merchants, and exiles at different times and became residents and citizens of Saudi Arabia. The dispersed communities and networks that they have forged in past and present urge a redefinition of belonging that does not depend on ethnocentric nationalism. These communities also present a picture of Sino-Arabian exchanges that is deeper, less structured, and more enduring than the one represented by the official diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia that came into force with the 1946 Treaty of Amity with the Republic of China and the 1990 treaty with the People’s Republic of China.
READ MORE....
Published by King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies
While the Chinese Muslim diaspora population in Saudi Arabia is smaller than the diaspora populations of South Asia, Central Asia or Southeast Asia, whose historical ties with the coasts of the Red Sea are known to have left enduring vestiges in and around Mecca, Chinese Muslim communities have forged their own enclaves in the Hijaz and beyond for the past century or so, making permanent homes in different parts of the Kingdom. Journeying from various parts of China, they arrived in Mecca, Ta’if and Jeddah as pilgrims, students, merchants, and exiles at different times and became residents and citizens of Saudi Arabia. The dispersed communities and networks that they have forged in past and present urge a redefinition of belonging that does not depend on ethnocentric nationalism. These communities also present a picture of Sino-Arabian exchanges that is deeper, less structured, and more enduring than the one represented by the official diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia that came into force with the 1946 Treaty of Amity with the Republic of China and the 1990 treaty with the People’s Republic of China.
READ MORE....
Saturday, September 10, 2016
SYMPOSIUM :: The Case Against Female Clerics in Islamic Law: A Cultural Basis Does Not a Legal Basis Make
Cleric Liu Xueqiang (刘学强) examines arguments rooted in cultural norms to find a legal basis for female clerics. He concludes that "female clerics originate[d] in the particular historical-cultural environs of the Central Plains of China," out of the region's "traditions of scriptural education." For him, though, these origins are at odds with fundamental Islamic principles espousing gender complementarity rather than sameness. Professor Man Ke's (满珂) assessments confirm Liu's cultural argument about the origins of the practice. She finds that "custom-based gender relations influence" Salafī women– that is, those who adhere to Saudi Arabia-inspired conservative interpretations of Islamic law that purport to go back to Islam’s founding period – to "consistently" believe that women can only be "female teachers," and never authorized clerics. Image credit: China Daily
SHARIA SOURCE AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
SHARIA SOURCE AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
An online symposium hosted by SHARIAsource, Islamic Legal Studies Program of Harvard Law School
An online symposium hosted by SHARIAsource, Islamic Legal Studies Program of Harvard Law School
Edited by Matthew S. Erie,
China Editor of SHARIAsource and Associate Professor at the University of Oxford
Sharia Source at
Harvard Law School - 06 Sep 2016
https://shariasourceblog.wordpress.com/2016/09/02/the-legal-basis-of-female-clerics-among-chinese-muslims/
One of the outstanding features of Islam in China is the presence of Chinese Muslim (Hui) female clerics (nü ahong). Women have attained the position of cleric in mosques most prominently in central China, in provinces such as Henan (Jaschok and Shui 2000; Shui and Jaschok 2002), and, in very small numbers, they have also attained such authoritative status in the more traditional and patriarchal Hui stronghold of the northwest, specifically, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. They perform the same functions as their male counterparts who in China are the equivalent of imam (the one who leads prayer) as well as the khaṭīb (one who gives the Friday sermon), in addition to spreading teachings and mediating disputes (Erie 2015).More often than not, the communities such female clerics lead are themselves predominantly female. These female mosques (nü si) operate just as the larger, mainly male mosques do, to which they are attached. They manage their own property and their finances, as well as take donations from followers and partake in religious observances such as Ramadan. Recently, the official media has touted the female clerics as an example of the unique contribution of China’s Islam—as progressive, inclusive, and modern—to global Islam (see e.g., Qi 2014). Female Muslim leaders from outside of China, such as in the United Kingdom, for example, have cited Hui female clerics as models of a moderate gender-balanced Islam (Gani 2016).
What is the legal basis of Hui female clerics? Neither the Qur’an nor the hadiths appear to provide a legal grounding specifically for female mosque leaders. Female clerics are much smaller in number than their male counterparts. There were approximately 934 registered female clerics, comprising approximately 3.4% of all “Islamic religious personnel” in China in 2013, according to one Chinese source (Musilin zai xian 2014). Further, certain doctrinal groups among Hui outright denounce female clerics. It is clear that the role of female clerics in Hui religious life is not a matter of consensus. Hui generally have limited means to develop their own fiqh due to the fact that state law is controlling in the People’s Republic of China. How then do Hui legitimize the role of female clerics in their communities?
This symposium examines the question of the legal basis for Hui female clerics through the opinions of leading clerics and scholars—female and male—from China, most of who are themselves Hui. The goal is to open up a space for reflection on and deliberation about an enduring feature of Muslim life in China and its connections to gender, culture, custom, and Islamic law. The symposium participants were asked to explain the legal basis of female clerics in China in 1,000 words or less. I provide English summaries of their responses below before including their commentaries in Chinese.
Mai Fenlian (买粉连), a former cleric who was educated in a female mosque and currently an Arabic instructor at the Xiajia Arabic class in Jiyuan City in Henan Province writes in her commentary “The Legal Basis and Value of the Existence of Female Clerics: My Opinion and Understanding” that there is a strong basis in the Qur’an for women’s equal footing in religious life among Muslims and hadith traditions authorize women’s activities in social activities from education to war. She makes a necessity argument stating that because Hui women know so little about Islamic law, female clerics in particular are needed to increase their legal knowledge, and smarter Hui women means more harmonious families and communities.
Ge Caixia (葛彩霞), the female cleric of Fuminli Female Mosque in Zhengzhou and who received her education both at Arabic schools and at female mosques, opines in her piece “The Legal and Social Bases for the Existence of China’s ‘Female Clerics” that there is evidence in both the Qur’an and the hadiths for gender equality. Based on hadiths, the Prophet Muhammad’s wife Aisha taught Islamic law, among other topics, to women. Moving well beyond classic Islamic sources and illustrating the dual register of “legal” as both that of Islam and the modern Chinese state, Ge Caixia cites a May 12, 2006 decision by the China Islamic Association that defines the requirements for an “Islamic staff member” as gender-blind.
Liu Xueqiang (刘学强), a male cleric based in Kaifeng City in Henan Province, writes in his commentary “Islam’s Gender Relations,” that the phenomenon of female clerics originates in the particular historical-cultural environs of the Central Plains of China (i.e., present day Henan Province). Although the Arabic word imam originally refers to “one who walks in front of others” and this can only be a man—not a woman—the role of the female cleric nevertheless developed out of traditions of scriptural education in the region. Thus, the position of the female cleric is a novelty among the four established schools of jurisprudence, and exists in tension with Islamic principles of gender complementarity.
Man Ke (满珂), a female professor at the Northwest Nationalities University, provides yet another perspective based on both her disciplinary background (anthropology) and her location (Lanzhou). In her untitled piece, Man Ke explains that the different “teaching schools” (jiaopai) and “Sufi solidarities” (menhuan) based in the northwest each have different views about female clerics and female mosques. Thus, doctrine colors views on gender. She interviewed Hui women from a number of different schools to elicit their views about the legality of female clerics and finds a range of views. Among non-Salafis, some respondents are ignorant of female mosques entirely whereas others yearn for such roles. Salafi women, on the other hand, consistently respond that there is no such role as “female cleric,” but only “female teachers,” the difference being that women, as Man Ke’s Salafi interlocutors believe, do not have the authority to lead religious exercises. Man Ke concludes that custom-based gender relations influence such thinking.
I gratefully acknowledge support for Mai Fenlian’s and Ge Caixia’s contributions from Shui Jingjun and Maria Jaschok.
References
Erie, Matthew S.2015 Qadi Justice in Chinese Courts: Dispute Resolution in Chinese Muslim Communities. Law and Social Inquiry 40(4):1001-1030.
Gani, Aisha
2016 “Meet Bana Gora, the woman planning Britain’s first female-managed mosque.” London: The Guardian. Accessed August 31, 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/jul/31/bana-gora-muslim-womens-council-bradford-mosque
Jaschok, Maria, and Jingjun Shui
2000 The History of Women’s Mosques in Chinese Islam: A Mosque of Their Own. Richmond: Curzon Press.
Musilin zai xian
2014 “Zhongguo nüxing teyou ahongzheng de you duoshao” [How many Chinese women are there that possess clerical certification?]. Beijing: Musilin zaixian [Muslim online]. Accessed December 15, 2015. Available at: http://www.muslimwww.com/html/2014/fengshang_0709/309.html
Qi, Chunmei
2014 “Qingzhensi li de nüahong” [Female clerics in the mosque]. Yinchuan: Ningxia Xinhuanet. Accessed December 13, 2015. Available at: http://www.nx.xinhuanet.com/2014-10/13/c_1112806117.htm
Shui, Jingjun , and Maria Jaschok
2002 Zhongguo qingzhen nüsi shi [A History of Chinese Female Mosques]. Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore.
An online symposium hosted by SHARIAsource, Islamic Legal Studies Program of Harvard Law School
An online symposium hosted by SHARIAsource, Islamic Legal Studies Program of Harvard Law School
Edited by Matthew S. Erie,
China Editor of SHARIAsource and Associate Professor at the University of Oxford
Sharia Source at
Harvard Law School - 06 Sep 2016
https://shariasourceblog.wordpress.com/2016/09/02/the-legal-basis-of-female-clerics-among-chinese-muslims/
One of the outstanding features of Islam in China is the presence of Chinese Muslim (Hui) female clerics (nü ahong). Women have attained the position of cleric in mosques most prominently in central China, in provinces such as Henan (Jaschok and Shui 2000; Shui and Jaschok 2002), and, in very small numbers, they have also attained such authoritative status in the more traditional and patriarchal Hui stronghold of the northwest, specifically, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. They perform the same functions as their male counterparts who in China are the equivalent of imam (the one who leads prayer) as well as the khaṭīb (one who gives the Friday sermon), in addition to spreading teachings and mediating disputes (Erie 2015).More often than not, the communities such female clerics lead are themselves predominantly female. These female mosques (nü si) operate just as the larger, mainly male mosques do, to which they are attached. They manage their own property and their finances, as well as take donations from followers and partake in religious observances such as Ramadan. Recently, the official media has touted the female clerics as an example of the unique contribution of China’s Islam—as progressive, inclusive, and modern—to global Islam (see e.g., Qi 2014). Female Muslim leaders from outside of China, such as in the United Kingdom, for example, have cited Hui female clerics as models of a moderate gender-balanced Islam (Gani 2016).
What is the legal basis of Hui female clerics? Neither the Qur’an nor the hadiths appear to provide a legal grounding specifically for female mosque leaders. Female clerics are much smaller in number than their male counterparts. There were approximately 934 registered female clerics, comprising approximately 3.4% of all “Islamic religious personnel” in China in 2013, according to one Chinese source (Musilin zai xian 2014). Further, certain doctrinal groups among Hui outright denounce female clerics. It is clear that the role of female clerics in Hui religious life is not a matter of consensus. Hui generally have limited means to develop their own fiqh due to the fact that state law is controlling in the People’s Republic of China. How then do Hui legitimize the role of female clerics in their communities?
This symposium examines the question of the legal basis for Hui female clerics through the opinions of leading clerics and scholars—female and male—from China, most of who are themselves Hui. The goal is to open up a space for reflection on and deliberation about an enduring feature of Muslim life in China and its connections to gender, culture, custom, and Islamic law. The symposium participants were asked to explain the legal basis of female clerics in China in 1,000 words or less. I provide English summaries of their responses below before including their commentaries in Chinese.
Mai Fenlian (买粉连), a former cleric who was educated in a female mosque and currently an Arabic instructor at the Xiajia Arabic class in Jiyuan City in Henan Province writes in her commentary “The Legal Basis and Value of the Existence of Female Clerics: My Opinion and Understanding” that there is a strong basis in the Qur’an for women’s equal footing in religious life among Muslims and hadith traditions authorize women’s activities in social activities from education to war. She makes a necessity argument stating that because Hui women know so little about Islamic law, female clerics in particular are needed to increase their legal knowledge, and smarter Hui women means more harmonious families and communities.
Ge Caixia (葛彩霞), the female cleric of Fuminli Female Mosque in Zhengzhou and who received her education both at Arabic schools and at female mosques, opines in her piece “The Legal and Social Bases for the Existence of China’s ‘Female Clerics” that there is evidence in both the Qur’an and the hadiths for gender equality. Based on hadiths, the Prophet Muhammad’s wife Aisha taught Islamic law, among other topics, to women. Moving well beyond classic Islamic sources and illustrating the dual register of “legal” as both that of Islam and the modern Chinese state, Ge Caixia cites a May 12, 2006 decision by the China Islamic Association that defines the requirements for an “Islamic staff member” as gender-blind.
Liu Xueqiang (刘学强), a male cleric based in Kaifeng City in Henan Province, writes in his commentary “Islam’s Gender Relations,” that the phenomenon of female clerics originates in the particular historical-cultural environs of the Central Plains of China (i.e., present day Henan Province). Although the Arabic word imam originally refers to “one who walks in front of others” and this can only be a man—not a woman—the role of the female cleric nevertheless developed out of traditions of scriptural education in the region. Thus, the position of the female cleric is a novelty among the four established schools of jurisprudence, and exists in tension with Islamic principles of gender complementarity.
Man Ke (满珂), a female professor at the Northwest Nationalities University, provides yet another perspective based on both her disciplinary background (anthropology) and her location (Lanzhou). In her untitled piece, Man Ke explains that the different “teaching schools” (jiaopai) and “Sufi solidarities” (menhuan) based in the northwest each have different views about female clerics and female mosques. Thus, doctrine colors views on gender. She interviewed Hui women from a number of different schools to elicit their views about the legality of female clerics and finds a range of views. Among non-Salafis, some respondents are ignorant of female mosques entirely whereas others yearn for such roles. Salafi women, on the other hand, consistently respond that there is no such role as “female cleric,” but only “female teachers,” the difference being that women, as Man Ke’s Salafi interlocutors believe, do not have the authority to lead religious exercises. Man Ke concludes that custom-based gender relations influence such thinking.
I gratefully acknowledge support for Mai Fenlian’s and Ge Caixia’s contributions from Shui Jingjun and Maria Jaschok.
References
Erie, Matthew S.2015 Qadi Justice in Chinese Courts: Dispute Resolution in Chinese Muslim Communities. Law and Social Inquiry 40(4):1001-1030.
Gani, Aisha
2016 “Meet Bana Gora, the woman planning Britain’s first female-managed mosque.” London: The Guardian. Accessed August 31, 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/jul/31/bana-gora-muslim-womens-council-bradford-mosque
Jaschok, Maria, and Jingjun Shui
2000 The History of Women’s Mosques in Chinese Islam: A Mosque of Their Own. Richmond: Curzon Press.
Musilin zai xian
2014 “Zhongguo nüxing teyou ahongzheng de you duoshao” [How many Chinese women are there that possess clerical certification?]. Beijing: Musilin zaixian [Muslim online]. Accessed December 15, 2015. Available at: http://www.muslimwww.com/html/2014/fengshang_0709/309.html
Qi, Chunmei
2014 “Qingzhensi li de nüahong” [Female clerics in the mosque]. Yinchuan: Ningxia Xinhuanet. Accessed December 13, 2015. Available at: http://www.nx.xinhuanet.com/2014-10/13/c_1112806117.htm
Shui, Jingjun , and Maria Jaschok
2002 Zhongguo qingzhen nüsi shi [A History of Chinese Female Mosques]. Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore.
SYMPOSIUM :: The Case for Female Clerics in Islamic Law: Textual Bases,Old and New, Religious and Secular
Mai Fenlian (买粉连) is a former cleric who argues that there is a textual basis in Islamic law for female clerics. She suggests that evidence can be found in the Qurʾān and ḥadīth (prophetic reports) supporting "women's equal footing in religious life" and legitimizing "women's activities in social activities, from education to war." To be sure, she hedges the textual argument with an argument about the benefits, commenting that having more knowledgeable Hui women would lead to "more harmonious families and communities." Another scholar, Ge Caixia (葛彩霞), also uses Islamic law texts as the basis for her main argument in favor of female clerics’ authority, citing a ḥadīth relaying that "the Prophet Muhammad’s wife Aisha taught Islamic law, among other topics, to women." She complements the Islamic law texts with an argument from modern Chinese law, which "defines the requirements for an 'Islamic staff member' [to be] gender-blind."
Thursday, September 8, 2016
LANDSCAPE S OF SPIRITUALITY: THE TOPOGRAPHY OF ISMAILI SACRED SITES IN XINJIANG, CHINA
AMIER SAIDULA
Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford Online
ISSN: 2040-1876 New Series, Volume VIII, no. 3 (2016)
Introduction
When speaking of t he attributes of p laces , it might be worth not ing that they are not only geophysical, biological, cultu ral and historical , but also religious, spiritual or mystical. N atural phenomena, such as mountains, rocks, fossils, individual trees, grov es, springs, lakes and rivers, are also considered sacred by some cultures . The Abrahamic religions and many other faith systems all at tach spiritual importance to certain places , and millions of people worldwide recognize and value the special significance that is attributed to them.
In the pluralistic cultural landscape of Islam, apart from the annual h ajj pilgrimage, one of the Five Pillars of Islam, mazar visit s , a pilgrimage - like practice, are symbolic of the regional cultural expression of Islam in many Muslim societies , though some such societies may proscribe it . This study is a brief ethnography of sacred sites venerated ( mazur tawuf chaig in the local vernacular ) by the small Shi’i Ismaili community of Tashkurgan, in Xinjiang in the People’s Republic of China (PRC ; see map below ).
This article documents some of the important sacred sites and their relevance today, in an age of economic and social change. Since in Islam the term ‘pilgrimage’ is often associated w ith the annual hajj to Mecca, the term ‘visit’ is used for the local pilgrimage - like tradition being discussed here to avoid confusion. The study is based on data collect ed in the Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County in Xinjiang in the summer of 2011.
READ MORE....
Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford Online
ISSN: 2040-1876 New Series, Volume VIII, no. 3 (2016)
Introduction
When speaking of t he attributes of p laces , it might be worth not ing that they are not only geophysical, biological, cultu ral and historical , but also religious, spiritual or mystical. N atural phenomena, such as mountains, rocks, fossils, individual trees, grov es, springs, lakes and rivers, are also considered sacred by some cultures . The Abrahamic religions and many other faith systems all at tach spiritual importance to certain places , and millions of people worldwide recognize and value the special significance that is attributed to them.
In the pluralistic cultural landscape of Islam, apart from the annual h ajj pilgrimage, one of the Five Pillars of Islam, mazar visit s , a pilgrimage - like practice, are symbolic of the regional cultural expression of Islam in many Muslim societies , though some such societies may proscribe it . This study is a brief ethnography of sacred sites venerated ( mazur tawuf chaig in the local vernacular ) by the small Shi’i Ismaili community of Tashkurgan, in Xinjiang in the People’s Republic of China (PRC ; see map below ).
This article documents some of the important sacred sites and their relevance today, in an age of economic and social change. Since in Islam the term ‘pilgrimage’ is often associated w ith the annual hajj to Mecca, the term ‘visit’ is used for the local pilgrimage - like tradition being discussed here to avoid confusion. The study is based on data collect ed in the Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County in Xinjiang in the summer of 2011.
READ MORE....
Wednesday, September 7, 2016
Shariah With Chinese Characteristics
A Scholar Looks at the Muslim Hui
By IAN JOHNSON
The New York Times - SEPT. 6, 2016
READ MORE.....
By IAN JOHNSON
The New York Times - SEPT. 6, 2016
Matthew S. Erie, a trained lawyer and ethnographer who teaches at Oxford University,
lived for two years in Linxia, a small city in the northwestern Chinese
province of Gansu. Known as China’s Mecca, it is a center of religious
life for the Hui, an ethnic minority numbering 10 million who practice
Islam. Along with the Turkic Uighurs,
they are one of 10 officially recognized ethnic groups that practice
Islam, making the total population of Muslims in China around 23
million, according to the 2010 government census.
Mr. Erie’s recently published book, “China and Islam: The Prophet, the Party, and Law,” is a look at how Shariah
— Islamic law and ethics — is implemented among the Hui. In an
interview he discussed his findings, which confound many preconceptions
about Shariah, Chinese law and the rigidity of the Communist state.
How
should we understand the statistics on Muslims in China? Officially
there are 23 million, but this assumes that Islam is an ethnicity, and
that all Hui, or all Uighurs, must be Muslim.
READ MORE.....
Tuesday, September 6, 2016
Meet China Event Strengthens Economic Ties Between China and the UAE
READ MORE....
Monday, September 5, 2016
China’s interests in Afghanistan
By Angela Stanzel
China Policy Institute – September 5, 2016
China’s role in Afghanistan is gradually evolving towards more engagement in various areas. This increasing engagement reflects both China’s concerns about the deterioration of security in Afghanistan since large numbers of international security forces withdrew from the country in 2014, and its interest in benefiting from a reconstructed Afghanistan. Last year, the Taliban controlled up to 70 districts (out of the country’s 398), unexpectedly even including Kunduz for a brief period. The Taliban’s 2016 “Spring Offensive” – a series of attacks the group launches each year after the end of winter – included a major bombing in Kabul in April, which killed and injured more than 400 people. In June, security guards at the Canadian embassy in Kabul were attacked; in July, the Taliban drove a truckload of explosives into a foreign military facility; in August, militants stormed the campus of the American University of Afghanistan in Kabul.
READ MORE....
China Policy Institute – September 5, 2016
China’s role in Afghanistan is gradually evolving towards more engagement in various areas. This increasing engagement reflects both China’s concerns about the deterioration of security in Afghanistan since large numbers of international security forces withdrew from the country in 2014, and its interest in benefiting from a reconstructed Afghanistan. Last year, the Taliban controlled up to 70 districts (out of the country’s 398), unexpectedly even including Kunduz for a brief period. The Taliban’s 2016 “Spring Offensive” – a series of attacks the group launches each year after the end of winter – included a major bombing in Kabul in April, which killed and injured more than 400 people. In June, security guards at the Canadian embassy in Kabul were attacked; in July, the Taliban drove a truckload of explosives into a foreign military facility; in August, militants stormed the campus of the American University of Afghanistan in Kabul.
READ MORE....
The Rise of China-Afghanistan Security Relations
Over the past two years, China-Afghan security cooperation has reached unprecedented levels.
By Ahmad Bilal Khalil
THE DIPLOMAT - June 23, 2016
Today’s China-Afghanistan security relations, under Afghanistan’s National Unity Government (NUG), are closer than ever. The trend of increasing Sino-Afghan security relations, along with good diplomatic and economic relations, came after President Ashraf Ghani’s first trip abroad — to China in October 2014. There, he was warmly received by President Xi Jinping himself at the airport; during the visit, Ghani’s Chinese counterpart announced $329 million in Chinese grants.
Since 2001, Beijing has been diplomatically and economically engaged in Afghanistan; however, since the establishment of the NUG, it is now slowly becoming practically engaged in Afghan security and defense affairs as well.
Chinese security pledges and assistance are generally overestimated by some Afghans, but, one thing is certain — this is just the beginning of Chinese initiatives to help Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). More Chinese assistance will be crucial if Beijing really wants to successfully complete its One Belt, One Road initiative, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); remove its concerns about the emergence of the Islamic State; and eliminate safe havens for Uyghur militants in the region, particularly in the Pak-Afghan belt.
READ MORE....
By Ahmad Bilal Khalil
THE DIPLOMAT - June 23, 2016
Today’s China-Afghanistan security relations, under Afghanistan’s National Unity Government (NUG), are closer than ever. The trend of increasing Sino-Afghan security relations, along with good diplomatic and economic relations, came after President Ashraf Ghani’s first trip abroad — to China in October 2014. There, he was warmly received by President Xi Jinping himself at the airport; during the visit, Ghani’s Chinese counterpart announced $329 million in Chinese grants.
Since 2001, Beijing has been diplomatically and economically engaged in Afghanistan; however, since the establishment of the NUG, it is now slowly becoming practically engaged in Afghan security and defense affairs as well.
Chinese security pledges and assistance are generally overestimated by some Afghans, but, one thing is certain — this is just the beginning of Chinese initiatives to help Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). More Chinese assistance will be crucial if Beijing really wants to successfully complete its One Belt, One Road initiative, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); remove its concerns about the emergence of the Islamic State; and eliminate safe havens for Uyghur militants in the region, particularly in the Pak-Afghan belt.
READ MORE....
Saudi Arabia To Buy Chinese UAVs
DEFENSE WORLD - September 4, 2016
The US ally Saudi Arabia has signed a deal with China to buy drones that are capable of carrying missiles and laser guided bombs. The drones Wing Loong (Pterodactyl), which are also capable of using other modern methods of firing, are beneficial to Saudi kingdom in its operation against rebels. The agreement to sell the UAVs, developed by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, was signed within the framework of the visit of the Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the second Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Muhammad Bin Salman. The medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAV is an effective tool for reconnaissance missions and information monitoring, Arab newspaper Al-Watan reported. The UAV can also be used for civil tasks such as disaster assessment, meteorological operations, and environmental protection. Wing Loong II, an upgraded version of the Wing Loong, was unveiled at the Beijing Aviation Expo held in September 2015. In recent years, there is friendly cooperation in the field of technological equipment and staff training as well ,said a member of the Chinese State Council, Defense Minister Chang Wanquan during a meeting with his Saudi counterpart Muhammad Bin Salman. Saudi Arabia is the main platforms through which China aims to enhance its military as well as political influence in the Middle East, military analyst Viktor Baranets was quoted as saying to Sputnik News Friday. The military-technical ties between China and Saudi Arabia could have some serious influence on global geopolitics and this could be a matter of concern for the US, the analyst added.
READ MORE.....
The US ally Saudi Arabia has signed a deal with China to buy drones that are capable of carrying missiles and laser guided bombs. The drones Wing Loong (Pterodactyl), which are also capable of using other modern methods of firing, are beneficial to Saudi kingdom in its operation against rebels. The agreement to sell the UAVs, developed by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, was signed within the framework of the visit of the Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the second Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Muhammad Bin Salman. The medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) UAV is an effective tool for reconnaissance missions and information monitoring, Arab newspaper Al-Watan reported. The UAV can also be used for civil tasks such as disaster assessment, meteorological operations, and environmental protection. Wing Loong II, an upgraded version of the Wing Loong, was unveiled at the Beijing Aviation Expo held in September 2015. In recent years, there is friendly cooperation in the field of technological equipment and staff training as well ,said a member of the Chinese State Council, Defense Minister Chang Wanquan during a meeting with his Saudi counterpart Muhammad Bin Salman. Saudi Arabia is the main platforms through which China aims to enhance its military as well as political influence in the Middle East, military analyst Viktor Baranets was quoted as saying to Sputnik News Friday. The military-technical ties between China and Saudi Arabia could have some serious influence on global geopolitics and this could be a matter of concern for the US, the analyst added.
READ MORE.....
China’s proud 300-year history of female-led mosques is an inspiration to the west
THE GUARDIAN - Monday 29 August 2016
When I informed some of the female imams in Henan, central China, of the opening of women’s mosques in the US and in Europe, most recently in Copenhagen (Female imams make history with a new call to prayer, 27 August), they were delighted. Delighted that their proud history of female-led Islamic institutions, which can be traced back more than 300 years, has proved inspirational. By the same token, a more accurate and nuanced knowledge of China’s unique Islamic tradition (now no longer quite so unique) is called for. There is ample scholarship on the history of women’s mosques in China.
This history is a long one. Its unique manifestation of independent institutions, Nüxue or Nüsi – women’s (Qur’anic) school or women’s mosque – emerged from complex historical and socio-political negotiations over the nature of Muslim identity in the Chinese diaspora and over means to keep faith alive and religio-ethnic identity intact.
READ MORE....
When I informed some of the female imams in Henan, central China, of the opening of women’s mosques in the US and in Europe, most recently in Copenhagen (Female imams make history with a new call to prayer, 27 August), they were delighted. Delighted that their proud history of female-led Islamic institutions, which can be traced back more than 300 years, has proved inspirational. By the same token, a more accurate and nuanced knowledge of China’s unique Islamic tradition (now no longer quite so unique) is called for. There is ample scholarship on the history of women’s mosques in China.
This history is a long one. Its unique manifestation of independent institutions, Nüxue or Nüsi – women’s (Qur’anic) school or women’s mosque – emerged from complex historical and socio-political negotiations over the nature of Muslim identity in the Chinese diaspora and over means to keep faith alive and religio-ethnic identity intact.
READ MORE....
Tapping the potential of Gulf-China partnership
By Ehtesham Shahid
Al-Arabiya - Sunday, 4 September 2016
It is difficult to believe that the diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia were only established in the year 1990. Since then though, the growth in economic ties has been rapid and, in some ways, have become symptomatic of the Gulf-China trade relations.
READ MORE.....
Al-Arabiya - Sunday, 4 September 2016
It is difficult to believe that the diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia were only established in the year 1990. Since then though, the growth in economic ties has been rapid and, in some ways, have become symptomatic of the Gulf-China trade relations.
READ MORE.....
Sunday, September 4, 2016
Conference: Building the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and Advancing International Industrial Cooperation 6-9 September 2016, Xiamen, China
Venue: International Convention Center
Conference Agenda
Organizers: Silk Road Think Tank Association (SRTA)
Organizing Committee of China International
Fair for Investment & Trade (CIFIT)
Sponsors:
China Center for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS)
Foreign Affairs Office, Fujian People’s
Provincial Government
Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Xiamen
People’s Municipal Government
Xiamen Municipal Authority
for Conference Exhibition
Associate sponsors: Fudan University, Huaqiao University
Co-sponsors: Eco-Agriculture and Food Safety Forum for the Belt and
Road
Conference Agenda
Sept. 6th
Tuesday
Registration
18:30-20:00 Welcome
Reception
(Venue：Guoyan
Hall 2, International Conference Center Hotel)
1.
Welcome Remarks
Chair: Song Kening, Director
General of Foreign Affairs Office of Fujian People’s Provincial Government
Speakers:
Guo Yezhou，Vice-Minister
of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the
Council of CCCWS
Li Zhaoxing, Former Chinese Foreign Minister, President of China
Public Diplomacy Association, Honorary President of China People’s Diplomacy
Association
Xu Ningsheng, President of Fudan University
2.
MOU Signing between SRTA and Partners
Chair: Jia Yimin, President of Huaqiao
University
3. Issuing Certificate
Chair: Xu Yongquan, Deputy Director General of
CCCWS
Sept. 7th,
Wednesday
08:00-8:30 Registration
08:30 Opening ceremony (Venue:1E Hall, Conference
Center)
Chair: Xu
Ningsheng, President of Fudan University
Speeches by distinguished participants (8 minutes for
each)
Guo Yezhou，Vice-Minister
of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the
Council of CCCWS
Liang
Jianyong, Vice Governor of Fujian Province
Essam Sharaf, former Prime Minister of Egypt
Marzuki Alie, former Speaker of the People's Representative
Council, Indonesia
Bhokin
Bhalakula, former President of House
of Representatives, Thailand
Hassan
Ghafourifard, former Vice President
of Iran
09:30 Launching the Belt and Road Events Fund
Chair: Xu
Ningsheng, President of Fudan University
Special participants (Guo Yezhou, Liang Jianyong, Li
Zhaoxing, Li Xikui, Ni Chao，Xu Jiahao, Essam
Sharaf, Marzuki Alie,Bhokin Bhalakula, Hassan Ghafourifard,Bamdev Gautam), will
come up to the ball and touch it for launching the Fund.
09:45 Tea break
10:00 Plenary Meeting
Chair:
Guo Yezhou，Vice-Minister
of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the
Council of CCCWS
Speakers (6 minutes for each)
Li Zhaoxing, Former Chinese Foreign Minister, President of China
Public Diplomacy Association, Honorary President of China People’s Diplomacy
Association
Chandima
Weerakkody, Minister
of Petroleum Resources Development of Sri Lanka, former Deputy Speaker of
Parliament
Wei Jianguo, former Vice Minister of Ministry of Commerce, Deputy
Chair of Council of China Center for International Economic Exchanges
Robert John Carr, former Foreign Minister of Australia
Zhang
Yansheng, Secretary General of NDRC
Academic Committee and chief economist of CCIEE
Sione Vuna Faotusia, Minister of Justice, Tonga
Xu Lianjie, President of Hengan International, Hong Kong,
Yildirim Koc, Vice President of Patriotic Party, Turkey
Ye Feiwen, Deputy Director General of Provincial NDRC of Fujian
11:00 Free Discussions
12:00 Buffet Lunch
13:00-16:50 Parallel
Sessions
Panel I
Creating
sustainable and shared development opportunities
Wide
consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits are core to the building
of the MSR. It is imperative to set the orientation of the MSR in keeping with
the characteristics and demands of MSR countries, with emphasis on improving
their efficiency and capabilities and enabling development opportunities to
benefit more countries. This panel looks at the following issues: what
development opportunities the MSR can bring to countries; how to translate
these opportunities into actual productivity and sustainable growth; what
challenges there are in building the MSR; what sectors the MSR countries can
expect to see more and deeper connectivity in; how MSR projects can benefit
local societies and people, and how to give play to the role of Fujian as a key
link in the MSR, etc.
Venue: 2A02, Conference Center
Participants: (27 persons)
Robert John Carr, Yildirim Koc, Fazal Ur Rahman, Chen
Zhimin, Famiano Crucianelli, Phoak Kung, Lee Chack Fan, Roger Shapiro, Xu
Liping, Cai Zhenwei, Alka Acharya, Cem Gurdeniz, Li Yuan, Edy Prasetyono, Bouadam
Sengkhamkhoutlavong, Antonis Klapsis, Zhang Feng, Jaime Naval, Jia Yimin，Liu
Chenggong, Yong Hee Kong, Pan Hui, Chen Yugang, Xu Peiyuan, Lu Hua, Huang Qin,
Lv Xiaofeng
13:30-15:00 Section 1
Moderator:
Liu
Chenggong, Deputy Party Secretary of
CPC Committee, Fudan University
Speakers (8 minutes for each speaker):
Lee Chack
Fan, member of China Engineering
Academy, Director of the Jao Tsung-I Petite Ecole of Hong Kong University
Chen Zhimin, Dean of School of International Relations, Fudan
University
Famiano
Crucianelli, former Vice Foreign
Minister of Italy
Antonis
Klapsis, Elected member at the
Steering Committee, European Network of Political Foundations
Xu Liping, Research Fellow of Institute for Asian-Pacific
Studies, CASS
Yong Hee Kong, Senior Research Fellow of Institute of Strategic and
International Studies, Malaysia
Roger Shapiro,
Beijing Representative of the 48 Group Club
14:30-14:50 Free Discussion
14:50-15:00 Comments
Commentator:
Lee Chack
Fan, member of China Engineering Academy,
Director of the Jao Tsung-I Petite Ecole of Hong Kong University
15:00-15:10 Tea Break
15:10-16:40 Section 2
Moderator:
Famiano
Crucianelli, former Vice Foreign
Minister of Italy
Speakers (8 minutes for each speaker):
Fazal Ur
Rahman, Executive Director of
Pakistan-China Council, senior research fellow of Pakistan Institute for Policy
Research
Phoak Kung, Director General of Cambodia Institute of Strategic
Studies
Cem Gurdeniz,
retired Rear Admiral of Turkey
Li Yuan, Acting Professor of Institute of East Asian Studies,
University of Duisburg-Essen
Edy
Prasetyono, Executive Director of
ASEAN Studies Center, University of Indonesia
Bouadam Sengkhamkhoutlavong, Associate Professor and Director of Asia Research
Center (ARC), National University of Laos
Zhang Feng, Research Fellow in the Department of International
Relations, the Australian National University
Jaime Naval, Representative of Asia Center, University of the
Philippines
16:10-16:30 Free discussion
16:30-16:40 Comments
Commentator:
Fazal Ur
Rahman, Executive Director of
Pakistan-China Council, senior research fellow of Pakistan Institute for Policy
Research
Panel II:
Promoting concrete multiple-win
industrial cooperation
It has become
a common understanding that countries are supposed to give play to their
respective strengths to advance industrial cooperation and upgrade industrial
capabilities. Such approaches will prove to be effective means for enhancing
the value of national industrial chain, deepening regional cooperation and
building a community of interests. This panel looks at the following issues:
what barriers in systems and policies are holding back cooperation, investments
and trade among MSR countries; what interests and opportunities MSR countries
share despite differing levels of development; what issues in international
industrial cooperation deserve particular attention; how to best avoid
investment risks in multi-lateral projects; and how to build effective
financing mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of projects, etc.
Venue: 3A02
Conference Center
Participants: (26 persons)
Chandima Weerakkody, Shahab Enam Khan, Li Xiangyang,
Henry Tillman, XiongMeng, Adnan Akfirat, Wei Tengxiong, Mirza Shahzad Akbar,
Chen Zhanyuan, Peter Budd, Javier Alvarez, He Guangjun, Xu Yongquan, Xu Yifan,
Wu Libo, Ma Zhongwu, Mohammed Alim Gory, Chen Qi, Lin Chunyu, Dong Peiyi, Liu
Xiaodi, Zhang Minghao, Yu Hao, Lin Qingyu, Gao Yi, Chen Dongjing
13:30-15:00 Section 1
Moderator:
Xu Yongquan, Deputy Director General of CCCWS
Speakers (8 minutes for each speaker):
Li Xiangyang, President of Institute for Global and Asian-Pacific
Studies, CASS
Peter Budd, Fellow
of the 48 Group Club
Xiong Meng, Deputy Executive Director of China Industrial
Economic Association
Chen
Zhanyuan, President of Australia-Fujian
Industrial Business Association
Mirza
Shahzad Akbar, Executive Director of Foundation
for Fundamental Rights, Pakistan
Wu Libo, Professor at School of Economics and Associate Dean
of School of Data Science, Fudan University
Ma Zhongwu, Director
of Sri Lankan Studies Center, Beijing Foreign Studies University
14:30-14:50 Free Discussion
14:50-15:00 Comments
Commentator:
Peter Budd, Fellow
of the 48 Group Club
15:00-15:10 Tea Break
15:10-16:40 Section 2
Moderator:
Li Xiangyang, President of Institute for Global and Asian-Pacific
Studies, CASS
Speakers (8 minutes for each speaker):
Henry Tillman,
Founder, Chairman and CEO, Grison Peak Investment Bank
Wei
Tengxiong, Director of Board,
Tiandixing Electronics, Ltd., Quanzhou
Shahab Enam
Khan, Research Director at the
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute
Adnan
Akfirat, Chairman
of Turkish-Chinese Business Development and Friendship Association
Xu Yifan, Director of Institute for Logistics Studies, Fudan
University
Ha Quang Tuan,
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Hanoimilk Joint Stock Company, Vietnam
Javier Alvarez, Chairman of Casa de la Cultura China in Buenos
Aires, Argentina
16:10-16:30 Free Discussions
16:30-16:40 Comments
Commentator:
Shahab Enam
Khan, Research Director at the
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute
Panel III
Boosting people-to-people contacts and
cultural exchanges
As an
essential aspect of the MSR, connectedness is not only about “hard connection”
in terms of infrastructure, but also “soft connection” in terms of institutions
and rules as well as “human connection” in terms of people-to-people contacts.
This panel looks at the following issues: what are the effective means for
people-to-people and cultural exchanges; what types of people-to-people and
cultural exchanges are welcome to the people of MSR countries; what efforts the
MSR countries are to make to boost the people-to-people and cultural exchanges;
what issues deserve attention in the mutual learning between civilizations; and
what roles think-tanks, businesses, media and overseas Chinese can play in the
various aspects of the MSR?
Venue: 3C
Conference Center
Participants: (27 persons)
Indranana Abeysekera, KoKoHlaing, Muhammad Amir, Chen
Shihai, Xu Pixin, Victor Zheng, Zhai Kun,
Hamayoun Khan, NateeTaweesrifuengfung, You Runtian, Meron Medzini, Wang Rong,
Zeng Lu, Yang Luhui, Huang Chen, Liu Huailan, Huang Xinping, You Wei, Chen
Zhen, Liu Yong, Xiang Shimin, Zhao Xincheng, Zhao Xiaobo, Hou Zhiqiang, Zhao
Xindong
13:30-15:00 Section 1
Chair:
Zeng Lu, Vice President of Huaqiao University
Speakers (8 minutes for each speaker):
Indranana
Abeysekera, Founder and President of
Association for Sri Lanka China Social and Cultural Cooperation
Xu Pixin, Director of Hong Kong Center for Studies of Overseas
Chinese
Muhammad
Amir, Director of Pak Institute for
Peace Studies
Chen Shihai, Party Secretary of CPC Group and President of Fujian
Overseas Chinese Association
Natee Taweesrifuengfung, Director of School of Chinese Studies, Charoen
Pokphand Group, Thailand
Han Bo，President
of China Culture Foundation
Victor
Zheng, Assistant Director of Hong
Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong
14:30-14:50 Free Discussions
14:50-15:00 Comments
Commentator:
Indranana
Abeysekera, Founder and President of
Association for Sri Lanka China Social and Cultural Cooperation
15:00-15:10 Tea Break
15:10-16:40 Section 2
Moderator:
Muhammad
Amir, Director of Pak Institute for
Peace Studies
Speakers (8 minutes for each speaker):
Ko Ko Hlaing, Chairman of Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Myanmar
Hamayoun
Khan, Founding Member and Director of
Pakistan Council on China
Zhai Kun, Professor of School of International Relations, Peking
University
Meron
Medzini, Senior Fellow of Sino-Israel
Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL)
Wang Rong, Professor of Research Institute of Indian Ocean
Economics, Yunnan University
You Runtian, Chief Special Correspondent in Beijing, Zaobao,
Singapore
Yang Luhui, Professor and Director of Institute of Asia-Pacific
Studies, Shandong University
16:10-16:30 Free Discussions
16:30-16:40 Comments
Commentator:
Ko Ko Hlaing, Chairman of Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Myanmar
17:00-17:40 Closing Ceremony
(Venue: 2A01, Conference Center)
Chair: Jia
Yimin, President of Huaqiao University
Presentations by the three
panels
Panel I:
Lee Chack
Fan, member of China Engineering
Academy, Director of the Jao Tsung-I Petite Ecole of Hong Kong University
Panel II:
Peter Budd, Fellow of the 48 Group Club
Panel III:
Ko Ko Hlaing, Chairman of Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Myanmar
Closing remarks:
Guo Yezhou，Vice-Minister
of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the
Council of CCCWS
Evening: Capital-Projects Promotion Meeting by China
International Fair for Investment & Trade
Other Parallel
Events:
12:00-13:00
Provincial Leadership meeting with important
participants
13:30-17:00
Some of the participants attending Eco-Agriculture and Food
Safety Forum for the Belt and Road
15:30-16:30
Press Conference: 1C, Conference Center
18:00-20:00
Some of the participants attending the banquet for
important guest hosted by provincial leadership in the CIFIT
Sept. 8th
Thursday
Morning: Some of the participants attending the CIFIT
Opening Ceremony
Other participants touring Xiamen and Quanzhou
Afternoon: Participants Departing from Xiamen
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